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SOMETHING’S GOTTA GIVE: ORIGIN-BASED
E-COMMERCE SALES TAX
ABSTRACT
How to tax interstate online purchases is a frequently debated and
contentious topic in the business and tax arena. There are numerous parties
affected when a transaction occurs and each affected party would like a
taxation policy that benefits its own economic interests, without regard for
others. Neither the legislative nor the judicial branch has successfully
resolved this e-commerce taxation issue. With the growing need for tax
revenue, it is prudent for Congress to finally resolve this circuit split and
agree on a unifying Online Sales Tax Law. As opposed to the vast majority
of proposals pending in Congress, this Note proposes an Origin-Based
solution to the e-commerce taxation problem that would require affected
parties to compromise, but will bring uniformity to all states and benefit the
economy as a whole.
INTRODUCTION
How sales tax works is among the most commonly asked questions when
businesses file and pay their taxes. 1 The chief complication that encompasses
sales tax is the lack of uniformity throughout the states; over 9,000 taxing
jurisdictions exist in the United States, each with its own rules and rates. 2
Sales taxes become infinitely more complicated for online businesses, as
their customer bases are scattered throughout numerous taxing jurisdictions. 3
The economic and constitutional ramifications create a perplexing problem.
These complications must be tamed and regulated through federal
congressional action.
The Physical Presence and Nexus tests, derived from Quill Corp. v. N.
Dakota By & Through Heitkammp and its progeny, currently govern ecommerce sales taxes, and allow many online retailers and consumers to
dodge sales taxes entirely. 4 In turn, large online retailers have an unfair
advantage over big-box retailers, smaller local retailers, and brick and mortar
businesses, as the latter are subject to sales tax rules. 5 In most states, the
1. See Caron Beesley, Sales Tax 101 for Small Business Owners and Online Retailers, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/blogs/sales-tax-101-small-business-owners-and-onlineretailers (last updated Aug. 19, 2015).
2. See James G. S. Yang & Frank J. Aquilino, The Updated Status of Internet Commerce Tax
Law, 20 J. INTERNET L. 3, 8 (2016).
3. See Beesley, supra note 1.
4. See generally Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); see Scott Peterson, A Guide
to Click Through Nexus, AVALARA (June 30, 2016), http://www.avalara.com/blog/2016/06/30/aguide-to-click-through-sales-tax-nexus-for-small-businesses/; see also Robert W. Wood, 3 Ways to
Still Avoid Sales Tax Online, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2014, 8:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robe
rtwood/2014/03/04/3-ways-to-still-avoid-sales-tax-online/#21a51f8d57c2.
5. See Senator Heidi Heitkamp, Heitkamp Reinforces Need to Pass Marketplace Fairness Act,
YOUTUBE (July 23, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AOTzxuOqhRs.
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second highest tax revenues are derived from sales taxes; the highest is
personal income tax revenues. 6 In New York State counties, sales tax is the
single largest source of revenue, with an average of 27.8%. 7 Because it is
such a large source of revenue, e-commerce sales tax avoidance costs states
an aggregate of over $29.6 billion of lost revenues in 2015. 8 As e-commerce
continues to grow, those losses will only increase and the tax disparity
between online retailers and brick and mortar retailers will only grow. Many
states have already attempted to neutralize their revenue losses by targeting
online sales tax—some successfully, others not. 9 States are in immediate
need of a uniform online tax law, one that will not be thwarted by endless
and costly lawsuits by large companies in opposition to the sales tax. 10 It is
time for Congress to set working national guidelines that enable the states to
enforce and administer sales tax laws that best serve each states’ individual
tax objectives, local economies, businesses, and citizens.
The issues surrounding taxation of e-commerce were very prominent
after the introduction of the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, 11 but lost clout
soon after. The same complex issues are resurging, as many states search for
ways to decrease their deficits through sales tax revenues. 12 While most agree
that sales taxation for online retailers must be addressed, the disagreements
surround the best way to do so. 13 This Note suggests a strategy for Congress
to use in its attempt to resolve the online tax issue in a way that is best for all
6. See Pareesa Ashabi, The Struggle Over Internet Sales and Use Tax: Why the Marketplace
Fairness Act Could Be the Hero for Wall Street, Main Street, and the Fifty States, 49 U.S.F. L. REV.
543, 545 (2015).
7. See OFF. OF THE N.Y. ST. COMPTROLLER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT SALES TAXES IN NEW
YORK STATE: 2015 UPDATE (Mar. 2015), https://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/sale
stax2015.pdf.
8. Joyce Beebe, E-Commerce: Recent Developments in State Taxation of Online Sales, BAKER
INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y 2 (July 13, 2017), https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/21ea3b88/
BI-Brief-071317-CPF_Ecommerce.pdf.
9. See Verne G. Kopytoff, Amazon Pressured on Sales Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/technology/14amazon.html.
10. Florida, South Dakota, Colorado, Utah, and Texas offer some examples of states that have
released online sales tax bills which have been challenged in court. See Modernize Florida Taxes to
Fill Budget Gaps: Where we Stand, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.orlandosent
inel.com/opinion/os-ed-reform-florida-taxes-20160926-story.html; Chris Morran, Why You Should
Care About South Dakota’s Controversial Online Sales Tax Law, CONSUMERIST (Sept. 4, 2017,
4:08 PM), https://consumerist.com/2017/09/14/why-you-should-care-about-south-dakotas-contr
oversial-online-sales-tax-law/; Jim Brunner, States Fight Back Against Amazon.com’s Tax Deals,
SEATTLE TIMES http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/states-fight-back-against-amazoncomstax-deals/ (last updated Aug. 17, 2015); Chris Morran, President Signs Bill Making Internet Service
Tax Ban Permanent, CONSUMERIST, https://consumerist.com/2016/02/24/president-signs-billmaking-internet-service-tax-ban-permanent/ (last updated Sept. 27, 2016).
11. See generally Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013).
12. See generally Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016); see Modernize
Florida Taxes to Fill Budget Gaps, supra note 10; Why You Should Care About South Dakota’s
Controversial Online Sales Tax Law, supra note 10; Brunner, supra note 10; President Signs Bill
Making Internet Service Tax Ban Permanent, supra note 10.
13. See generally Yang & Aquilino, supra note 2.
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parties involved including sellers, buyers, and states, by utilizing a
Modernized Origin-Based Taxation Model. 14 This Modernized Test
preserves the Physical Presence requirement of Quill by charging an OriginBased sales tax at the rate of the seller’s location, rather than a DestinationBased sales tax, which is charged at the rate of the buyer’s location. This
proposal requires a collective effort from all parties affected by e-commerce
taxation; it also reduces complexity, eliminates use tax complications,
stimulates equal competition for all business models, preserves state
sovereignty, and naturally lowers sales taxes rates overall.
This Note attempts to resolve the complexities involved with the existing
e-commerce sales tax models and proposals by suggesting an updated and
simplified Origin-Based Physical Presence test for e-commerce taxation. Part
I will explain what a sales tax is, how it works, and why it is so complicated
in the e-commerce world. Part II discusses the sparse judicial history behind
e-commerce taxation, mainly two outdated Supreme Court rulings regarding
the constitutionality of e-commerce Sales Taxes. Part III describes several
Congressional proposals that have surfaced since the early 1900s. Next, Part
IV will discuss the various ways in which the states have dealt with online
sales taxes in the absence of federal action. Part V explains why e-commerce
taxation is of great economic and commercial significance and considers the
fiscal concerns involved. Lastly, Part VI suggests a long-term Modernized
Origin-Based Taxation Model for resolving these important financial
concerns.
I.

BACKGROUND: NUTS AND BOLTS OF SALES AND USE
TAXES

Sales and use taxes have been imposed by state and local governments
since the 1930s. 15 They are charged at the “retail point-of-purchase” and
based on a percentage of the total cost of the goods or services purchased. 16
As there are over 9,000 taxing jurisdictions, each state, county, and village
may have its own sales tax rules and rates. 17 Sellers charge their customers
on behalf of local taxing authorities at the point of sale and subsequently
remit the sales tax to their local authorities. 18 For example, a resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, makes a purchase at a local shop; the state of
Pennsylvania imposes a 6% sales tax rate and the city of Philadelphia

14. The Modernized Origin-Based Taxation Model is an original proposal for dealing with the
e-commerce taxation issue, set forth in Part VI of this note.
15. Ashabi, supra note 6, at 545.
16. See Beesley, supra note 1.
17. Yang & Aquilino, supra note 2, at 8.
18. Id.
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imposes an additional 2% sales tax rate; an aggregate of 8%. 19 Thus, in
addition to the sale price of the item, the seller must also charge an additional
8% sales tax fee on behalf of the state of Pennsylvania and the city of
Philadelphia taxing authorities. 20 The seller is then responsible for remitting
6% to the Pennsylvania taxing authorities and 2% to the Philadelphia taxing
authorities.
This sales tax model assumes that the buyer and seller are residents of
the same state, or that the purchase will be consumed in the state it was
purchased. 21 Because this is not always the case, “use taxes” were developed
to prevent shoppers from dodging sales taxes by traveling across state lines
to make purchases. 22 Absent the imposition of a use tax, out-of-state sellers
would have an unfair advantage because out-of-state buyers would not be
required to pay any tax on out-of-state purchases. 23 To ensure that buyers will
not be subject to a double tax, sales taxes and use taxes are mutually
exclusive—a buyer is only subject to one such tax on each purchase. 24 For
example, John travels from his home state Rhode Island to Virginia to
purchase a speed boat for his dock in Rhode Island. Upon leaving Virginia
with his new boat, Virginia will reimburse John for any sales tax paid on the
boat as he is not a Virginia resident, but when John returns to Rhode Island
it becomes his responsibility to remit a use tax in his home state. 25 Currently
forty-five states, including the District of Columbia, charge their residents
general sales and use taxes. 26 On the other hand, five states: New Hampshire,
Oregon, Montana, Alaska, and Delaware (known as NOMAD) do not charge
any sales and use taxes. 27
Charging sales taxes for online transactions is considerably more
complicated than charging sales taxes for in-person transactions because
often the buyer and seller are located in different states. 28 When a buyer and
seller are located in the same taxing jurisdiction it is quite simple: taxation
works the same way as it does for traditional in-person transactions. 29
However, when the buyer and seller are located in different taxing
19. See Sales, Use, & Hotel Occupancy Tax, CITY OF PHILA., https://beta.phila.gov/services/p
ayments-assistance-taxes/business-taxes/sales-use-hotel-occupancy-tax/ (last updated Jan. 10,
2017).
20. See generally Yang & Aquilino, supra note 2.
21. See Sales Tax, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/salestax.asp (last
visited Sept. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Sales Tax]; see also Yang & Aquilino, supra note 2 at 1–2.
22. See Use Tax, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/use-tax.asp (last visited
Sept. 17, 2017).
23. See id.
24. See What is the Difference Between Sales Tax and Use Tax?, SALES TAX INSTITUTE,
http://www.salestaxinstitute.com/Sales_Tax_FAQs/the_difference_between_sales_tax_and_use_t
ax (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) [hereinafter SALES TAX INSTITUTE].
25. See Sales Tax, supra note 21.
26. SALES TAX INSTITUTE, supra note 24.
27. See id.
28. See Beesley, supra note 1.
29. See id.
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jurisdictions the problem becomes infinitely more complicated. 30 In such
situations it is difficult to determine which state’s tax rates should apply to
the transaction and which taxing authorities should receive the tax
revenues. 31
Two major modes of taxation have developed to deal with this problem:
Destination-Based sales tax and Origin-Based sales tax. 32 Destination-Based
sales taxes require online retailers to charge their customers sales taxes based
on the buyer’s location. 33 This model requires sellers to keep track of
thousands of different taxing laws and to remit sales taxes to governments
outside its own jurisdiction. 34 Origin-Based sales taxes are charged based on
the seller’s location and remitted to the seller’s local government. 35 However,
this means that buyers will be subject to taxing rates outside of their
individual jurisdictions. 36 As the Supreme Court ruled in National Bellas
Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue and in Quill, both the Destination-Based and
Origin-Based Models face constitutional challenges including due process,
commerce clause, and state sovereignty. 37 However, because the OriginBased Model is taxed according to the seller’s rate, it creates the most
amicable environment for sellers to expedite sales taxes and to ensure that
sales taxes are properly paid. Simply put, the Origin-Based Sales Tax Model
is more efficient and less expensive to implement and enforce. 38
II. JUDICIAL INACTION: DUE PROCESS AND THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
The following section describes two seminal, yet outdated Supreme
Court cases that concern the online sales tax issue. Despite the need for
federal guidance, the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari for any cases
that would resolve this issue since Quill was decided in 1992.
A. NAT’L BELLAS HESS, INC. V. DEP’T OF REVENUE OF ILL.
E-commerce taxation is so significant because it involves many
constitutional implications. In 1967, the Supreme Court ruled that the state
of Illinois did not have jurisdiction to tax National Bellas Hess, an out-ofstate mail order company. 39 Since National Bellas Hess was an out-of-state
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Daniel Tarantola, Equal Footing: Correcting the E-Commerce Tax Haven, 10 BROOK.

J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 277, at 296–97.
33. Id.
34. See Yang & Aquilino, supra note 2, at 8.
35. Tarantola, supra note 32, at 296.
36. See id. at 297.
37. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 760 (1967) overruled
by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); see also Tarantola, supra note 32, at 296.
38. See Tarantola, supra note 32 at 298–99.
39. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759–60.
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company and did not have minimum contacts in Illinois, the Court ruled that
taxing it would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 40 Furthermore, to allow such a tax would interfere with
Congress’ right to regulate interstate commerce under the Dormant
Commerce Clause. 41 The Court concluded that because National Bellas Hess
did not have a physical presence in Illinois, forcing it to tax customers in
Illinois violates the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. 42 This
case originated the rule that states cannot require companies without physical
presence in the given state to impose a sales and use tax. 43
B. QUILL CORP. V. NORTH DAKOTA
In 1992 the Supreme Court’s decision in Quill partly overruled its
decision in National Bellas Hess. 44 The Court reasoned that since the time of
its decision in National Bellas Hess, the due process analysis had changed
for mail order businesses. 45 The Court held that Quill Corporation, having
established sufficient minimum contacts in North Dakota and, therefore
requiring Quill Corporation to charge North Dakota customers a sales tax,
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 46 However, the Supreme Court
partly affirmed its decision in National Bellas Hess, to the extent that taxation
of Quill Corporation infringed on Congress’ power to regulate interstate
commerce under the Dormant Commerce Clause and was thus
unconstitutional. 47 The Supreme Court in Quill favored the bright line
Physical Presence test established in National Bellas Hess. 48 The Court also
invited Congressional action, stating that Congress “remains free to disagree
with our conclusions” and that it “may be better qualified to resolve” this
issue. 49 The Court further stated that, “[i]n this situation, it may be that ‘the
better part of both wisdom and valor is to respect the judgment of the other
branches of the Government.’” 50
Since the Court’s ruling in Quill, e-commerce has become the universal
norm, forever changing the face of retail shopping. 51 This incredible
advancement, however, has also fueled relentless litigation, confusion, and
lost tax revenues. In a recent Supreme Court case, Direct Marketing v. Brohl,
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, specified that even the majority in
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See id. at 758.
See id. at 756, 760.
See id. at 760.
See id.
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 299 (1992).
See id. at 303.
See id. at 304.
See id. at 312–14.
See id. at 314–15.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 318–19.
See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Quill recognized that the ruling may have been a mistake. 52 He also noted
that many of the Supreme Court Justices ruled “based on stare decisis alone
. . . a holding now inflicting extreme harm and unfairness in the States.” 53 He
exclaimed that although the instant case was not the appropriate time to do
so, the Quill decision required appraisal. 54 Justice Kennedy’s sentiments lay
with brick and mortar retailers who remain seriously disadvantaged
compared to online retailers who are not subject to sales tax requirements. 55
As states increasingly face extreme deficits and continue to lose millions in
uncollected online sales tax revenues, the Quill Physical Presence
requirements must be evaluated. 56
Justice Kennedy is not alone in his belief that the Quill Physical Presence
test is outdated. 57 The newest justice on the Supreme Court, Justice Neil
Gorsuch, seems to hold a similar sentiment. 58 As a Tenth Circuit Judge,
Justice Gorsuch explained that the appellate courts are required to follow the
Quill Supreme Court precedent, “whether or not we profess confidence in the
decision itself.” 59 He went on to state that “while some precedential islands
manage to survive indefinitely even when surrounded by a sea of contrary
law a good many others disappear when reliance interests never form around
them or erode over time.” 60 Although it is unclear whether the Supreme Court
will overrule Quill in the near future, what is clear is that there are those on
the bench who would relish the opportunity to relinquish Quill.
III. CONGRESSIONAL INACTION IN A TIME OF NEED
Aside from the Supreme Court’s belief that Congress is in a better
position to tackle taxing issues, the aforementioned complications may be the
true reason that the Supreme Court passed this complex issue onto Congress
in 1992. 61 Since then, Congress has left e-commerce sales taxation to the
states. This decision goes far beyond the idea that states are the “laboratories
of democracy.” 62 The issue is incredibly complex and there is no way to
wholly please all the parties involved; parties must be willing to make
compromises to settle this problem. However, it is difficult to decide which
parties should have to make sacrifices, and asking constituents to
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See id. at 1134.
Id..
See id. at 1135.
See id.
See generally id.; see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); Beebe, supra

note 8.
57. See Michael Tackeff, The Quill Dilemma: Looming Changes in Collecting Online Sales Tax,
STATE TAX NOTES MAG., Sept. 4, 2017, LEXIS.
58. See id.
59. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 1151.
61. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 760 (1967), overruled
by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
62. Id.
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compromise does not tend to garner reelection votes for incumbent
congressmen. 63 Perhaps this is the reason Congress has yet to resolve the
issue.
A. FROM THE INTERNET FREEDOM ACT OF 1998 TO THE
MARKETPLACE FAIRNESS ACT OF 2013
Congress passed the Internet Freedom Act to protect telecommunication
from tax fees. 64 At that time, the government worried that fees for internet
services would discourage the public from using the Internet, but this Act
was designed to counter that fear and encourage wide public use of the
Internet. 65 Since then, the Internet has become an indispensable tool. The
concern that taxation of online activities would damper growth and
discourage use is severely misplaced. Despite this reality, the Internet
Freedom Act was extended by Congress in 2007, allowing online retailers to
continue to shirk tax obligations that other businesses are required to pay.66
In 2015, Congress signed the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act
which essentially extended the Internet Freedom Act’s online taxing
moratorium indefinitely. 67 Thus, although there are no longer any rational
fears that taxing online companies will discourage e-commerce activities, the
current law has not progressed. As such, we now have a system in which
there are severe taxing inequalities between online retailers and brick and
mortar retailers. 68
These inequalities have led to numerous proposals and state taxing laws,
which aim to end this dichotomy by leveling the playing field for all business
models and raising tax revenues by imposing sales tax obligations on online
businesses. 69 In 2002, the National Governors Association signed the
Streamline Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA), the result of a
collaborative effort by forty-four states and the District of Columbia. 70
SSUTA attempts to simplify the Sales and Use tax system, predominantly the
complications associated with sales that cross state lines. 71 However, SSUTA
has further complicated online sales taxation with the system of “sourcing

63. See Chris Cilllizza, Everyone Wants Congress to Compromise. So, Why Don’t They? WASH.
POST (July 23, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/07/23/everyonewants-congress-to-compromise-so-why-dont-they/?utm_term=.802add611e66.
64. See Yang & Aquilino, supra note 2, at 4.
65. See id. at 7.
66. See generally JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONGR. RES. SERV., THE INTERNET TAX FREEDOM
ACT: IN BRIEF (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43772.pdf.
67. See President Signs Bill Making Internet Service Tax Ban Permanent, supra note 10.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. What is the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement?, STREAMLINED SALES TAX
GOVERNING BOARD, INC. (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=g
en1.
71. See id.
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rules.” 72 These rules provide that requirement to charge at either the seller’s
or the buyer’s rate depends on a number of factors including: whether the
goods are delivered or picked-up, the nature of the item being sold, and the
business model of the seller. 73 These are just three of the many elements that
a seller must take into consideration upon each individual sale. 74 Overall,
SSUTA favors a Destination-Based tax, but this preference requires sellers
to jump through hoops, specifically when the buyer’s locality cannot be
determined. 75 It also requires sellers to know countless rules scattered
throughout the 252-page proposed legislation. 76 Because SSUTA is so
complicated, it is unattractive to many states and to most sellers. 77 Despite its
complications, SSUTA’s “sourcing rules” are used as a basis for many other
proposals, including the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013. 78
The Marketplace Fairness Act was introduced 2013, and although it was
passed by the Senate, it is still pending in the House of Representatives. 79 It
was reintroduced to the Senate in 2015, but again the attempts were
fruitless. 80 On April 27, 2017, the Marketplace Fairness Act was introduced
to the Senate yet a third time. 81 Although there is bipartisan support, it is still
unclear whether the Act will be adopted. 82 One major problem with the
Marketplace Fairness Act is that it does not eliminate the complications
associated with SSUTA because it requires states to become members of
SSUTA. 83 The Act provides that any state that refuses to become a member
of SSUTA must comply with certain minimum requirements, which are even
more cumbersome than becoming a member of SSUTA. 84 These minimum
requirements include establishing a single state taxing administration and one
uniform state tax rate, providing sellers with free taxing software, and
requiring sellers to comply with the sales sourcing rules. 85 Because the
minimum requirements are burdensome and do not provide viable

72. See STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT (Amended 2017) at 18–32,
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/downloads/Archive/SSUTA/SSUTA%20As%20Ame
nded%202017-5-11.pdf.
73. Id. at 19–21.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 32.
76. See id.
77. See Yang & Aquilino, supra note 2, at 9.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 10; see also Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013).
80. See generally Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. (2015).
81. See generally Marketplace Fairness Act of 2017, S. 976, 115th Cong. (2017).
82. See News Release, U.S. Senator for Wyoming: Mike Enzi, Bipartisan Group of Senators
Introduce Marketplace Fairness Act of 2017 to Allow States to Close Sales Tax Loophole (Apr. 27,
2017), https://www.enzi.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/4/bipartisan-group-of-senators-introdu
ce-marketplace-fairness-act-of-2017-to-allow-states-to-close-sales-tax-loophole.
83. See Ashabi, supra note 6, at 560.
84. See id.
85. See Yang & Aquilino, supra note 2, at 10–11.
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alternatives, 86 states will be strong-armed into adopting SSUTA against their
will.
The Marketplace Fairness Act preserves SSUTA’s “sales sourcing
rules,” thus it does not eliminate many of the complications associated with
Destination-Based tax rate. 87 Further, although the Act has a preemption
clause allowing the states to adopt legislation that conflicts with the Act,
because there are hefty minimum requirements non-member states much
implement, it will still be exceedingly difficult for states to deal with ecommerce in their own way. 88 This infringement on state sovereignty will
cause states that prefer lower sales tax rates to raise their rates because their
local online retailers will be required to charge higher out-of-state rates
regardless of their lower in-state tax rates. 89
The Remote Transactions Parity Act of 2015 is similar to the
Marketplace Fairness Act, but with an added layer of protection for small
remote retailers. 90 This Act gives small remote sellers a three-year grace
period before requiring them to charge and remit sales taxes. 91 After the
three-year grace period expires, small remote sellers are required to charge
and remit sales taxes like large online retailers. 92 One glaring problem is that
the Remote Transaction Parity Act retains all the SSUTA requirements that
plague the Marketplace Fairness Act. 93
B. VALUE ADDED TAX PROPOSALS
Some politicians have proposed using European Value Added Tax
(VAT) in lieu of the current system. 94 In countries that utilize the VAT, taxes
are remitted to the government at each stage of a product’s development
based on a percentage of the value added to the product. 95 For instance, if a
flour refinery buys wheat grains for $50 and sells the flour produced from
those wheat grains to a bread maker for $100, the refinery must remit a tax
to its taxing authorities based on a percentage of its $50 profit. 96 Again, at
86. See generally id.
87. Id. at 10.
88. See generally id.; see also Sylvia F. Dion, The MFA v. the RTPA: Will Changes in the House

and an Expiring ITFA Help Advance or Further Stall Federal Remote Seller Bills?, BNA (Nov. 20,
2015), http://www.bna.com/mfa-rtpa-changes-n57982063794/.
89. See Chris Matthews, Get Ready to Pay a Lot More in Sales Tax, FORTUNE (Aug. 25, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/08/25/online-sales-tax/.
90. See generally Remote Transactions Parity Act of 2015, H.R. 2775, 114th Cong. (2015).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. For examples, see Curtis S. Dubay, The Value Added Tax is Wrong for the United States,
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/t
he-value-added-tax-is-wrong-for-the-united-states; Lila Disque & Helen Hecht, Beyond Quill and
Congress: The Necessity of Sales Tax Enforcement and the Invention of a New Approach, 65 AM.
U. L. REV. 1163, 1175 (2016).
95. See Disque & Hecht, supra note 94, at 1174.
96. See generally id.
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the next stage, the bread maker who purchased the flour for $100 and sells
the bread made by that flour for $200 must remit a tax to his taxing authorities
based on a percentage of his $100 profit. 97 Thus, at each point of sale, a tax
is remitted based on a percentage of the seller’s gross profit margin, as
opposed to charging the consumer at the end of the chain. Implementing a
VAT tax system in the United States would require changing the entire tax
system as a whole. It does not seem like a plausible solution, nor one that can
be swiftly implemented without an arduous battle in government.
The European Union, which utilizes a VAT system, has already faced
criticism because the VAT rules only apply to registered VAT businesses;
thus, when a transaction occurs between a registered business and a nonregistered business, the rules are exponentially complicated. 98 Implementing
a VAT system in the United States would pose similar issues. The European
Union has reported extensive fraud and tax evasion under the VAT system
and nothing suggests that such evasion can be avoided if the United States
were to utilize the VAT model. 99 Further, similar to SSUTA, it would require
each state to register and agree to comply with VAT rules, and since proper
implementation of a VAT system would require national cooperation, it
would create a conflict for states who wish to set individual sale tax rates and
regulations. 100 For some, the grass looks greener on the other side, but fixing
the existing tax system is a more practicable solution than adopting a whole
new system.
C. ONLINE SALES SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 2015 AND 2016
In January of 2015, Representative Robert Goodlatte proposed the
Online Sales Simplification Act of 2015 (2015 Proposal). 101 This proposal
requires states to become members of a federal clearinghouse that would be
responsible for remitting sales tax revenues from origin states to destination
states. 102 To become a member, states must propose a single state tax rate and
must charge sales taxes at the rate of the origin state. 103 States that are not
members of a federal clearinghouse will not be permitted to receive
distributions from the federal clearinghouse, and the sales tax revenues
generated by non-member states will be given back to the given origin
state. 104 The NOMAD states, those that do not impose any sales taxes, will
97.
98.
99.
100.

See generally id.
See id. at 1176.
See Dubay, supra note 94.
See Value-Added Tax - VAT, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/valuead
dedtax.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
101. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, DISCUSSION DRAFT OF ORIGIN-BASED ONLINE SALES
SIMPLIFICATION ACT RELEASED 1 (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/state-local-tax/news
letters/salt-insights/assets/pwc-discussion-draft-origin-based-online-sales-simplification-act.pdf.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 2.
104. See id.
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either be required to charge their buyers sale taxes and remit the revenues to
the federal clearinghouse, or report the sale to the federal clearinghouse.105
The main concern of the 2015 Proposal was that Origin-Based taxes pose
“constitutional infirmities” under the Due Process Clause for out-of-state
buyers who would be subject the tax rates of jurisdictions other than their
own. 106 Some critics claim that the 2015 Proposal will cause a race to the
bottom for states that desire to remain competitive and attract businesses with
their tax rates. 107
These criticisms of the 2015 Proposal prompted Representative
Goodlatte to release a more recent draft of the Proposal in August 2016 (2016
Proposal). This 2016 Proposal is similar to the 2015 Proposal in that it
provides for a federal clearinghouse and in its treatment of non-member
states and NOMAD states. 108 However, a key difference is that, rather than
calculating tax rates by the origin states based on the rates of origin states,
sales tax rates are Destination-Based and remitted to the destination state
through the clearinghouse. 109 However, the Destination-Based Model is one
of the major problems associated with the Marketplace Fairness Act, a
probable reason why the Marketplace Fairness Act has been pending in
Congress for some time. 110 Further, this 2016 Proposal does not adequately
address the problems associated with Destination-Based taxation, such as due
process challenges by sellers, state sovereignty, rising tax rates, and a
potential double taxation problem for those states that do not wish to become
members of the federal clearinghouse. 111
D. NO REGULATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION ACT OF 2016
Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner introduced a strict Origin-Based
Taxing Proposal in July 2016. 112 This proposal aims to establish a federal law
based on the narrow Quill Physical Presence test in that it would essentially
“codify the physical presence requirement” as it was stated by the Supreme
Court in Quill. 113 It would preempt any state laws that conflict and would not
allow any future state legislation regarding e-commerce. 114 The proposal also
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Curtis Dubay & James Gattuso, Goodlatte’s Internet Sales Tax Plan is Better, but Still

Falls Short, THE DAILY SIGNAL (Aug. 29, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/08/29/goodlattesinternet-sales-tax-plan-is-better-but-still-falls-short/.
108. See id.; see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 101.
109. See Dubay & Gattuso, supra note 107; see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note
101.
110. See Dubay & Gattuso, supra note 107.
111. See id.
112. See Stephen P. Kranz, Marc Yopp & Eric Carstens, Breaking New: Physical Presence
Requirement Bill Introduced in Congress, INSIDESALT (July 15, 2016), http://www.insidesalt.com/
2016/07/breaking-news-physical-presence-requirement-bill-introduced-in-congress/.
113. See id.
114. See id.
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provides that a seller cannot be subject to any given taxing jurisdiction unless
it is physically present within that jurisdiction for a minimum of fifteen days
per taxable year. 115 This proposal is a relapse, as it would preempt all state
legislation that has attempted to level the playing field and raise state tax
revenues.
IV. STATES TAKING ACTION

A. EXPANSION OF QUILL PHYSICAL PRESENCE: NEXUS
Although the Supreme Court gave Congress full reign to pass federal
legislation to overturn Quill, almost twenty-five years have passed and
Congress has not taken such action. 116 Accordingly, the Physical Presence
requirement is still the prevailing requirement under the Commerce Clause.
That said, over the years, many states have been facing budget crises and as
a result, have passed legislation to try and capture tax revenues generated by
e-commerce. 117 In doing so, states have developed the concept of “Nexus,”
or “substantial physical presence” which has expanded the definition of
“physical presence” far beyond the narrow confines of the Quill Physical
Presence test. 118 Companies with a substantial economic presence in a given
state are deemed to have a physical presence there under the Commerce
Clause, thereby for sales tax purposes. 119 Most states define Nexus as
“maintaining, occupying, or using permanently or temporarily, directly or
indirectly or through a subsidiary” any place of business or business
facility. 120 Nexus also includes “having a representative, agent, salesman,
canvasser, or solicitor” within a given state although the main businesses are
physically located in a different state. 121
Some states have implemented a “Click-Through-Nexus” which applies
specifically to online companies and carries Nexus one step further because
it does not require physical presence of facilities or persons; 122 it is
established when an out-of-state seller makes a certain amount of revenue
from buyers in a given state through referrals from an in-state agent.123
Sellers must be making commission payments to the in-state agent for any

115. See id.
116. See generally supra Part III.
117. For examples, see Modernize Florida Taxes to Fill Budget Gaps, supra note 10; Why You

Should Care About South Dakota’s Controversial Online Sales Tax Law, supra note 10; Brunner,
supra note 10; President Signs Bill Making Internet Service Tax Ban Permanent, supra note 10.
118. See Peterson, supra note 4.
119. See What is Nexus?, SALES TAX INSTITUTE, http://www.salestaxinstitute.com/Sales_Tax_
FAQs/What_is_nexus, (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id.
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order that comes about as a result of the click-through referral from the
agent’s website. 124
Other states have an affiliate tax which imposes a tax on any activities
by an out-of-state business “related to sales, delivery, service and maintaining
a place of business in the state on behalf of the out-of-state business to benefit
the out-of-state business’ customers.” 125 These Nexus expansions make it
cumbersome and costly for many online businesses that must determine
whether they have enough presence within a consumer’s state to satisfy that
state’s particular Nexus laws and whether they must charge a sales tax to
consumers in that state.
B. “AMAZON TAX”
Some states have passed a Nexus test known as an “Amazon Tax.” 126 In
New York, for example, out-of-state online retailers who receive “cumulative
gross receipt from sales” of over $10,000 a year from New York buyers are
required to register as vendors in New York. 127 This creates a “physical
presence” in New York for sales tax purposes. 128 Thus, the registered vendor
must charge New York consumers New York sales taxes and remit the tax
revenues to the New York taxing authorities. 129 The “Amazon Tax” was
immediately challenged by large online retailers such as Amazon and
Overstock, and while many state courts have upheld the tax, others have stuck
it down. 130 Currently, over forty states impose Nexus sales tax laws on outof-state companies, each state having its own specific requirements that
companies must meet in order for Nexus to be established. 131
C. COLORADO’S INCREASED NOTIFICATION LAWS
One way that states ensure they will receive sales and use tax revenues
from online purchases is through Increased Notification laws. 132 Colorado
passed legislation requiring non-Colorado online retailers to inform Colorado
buyers of their duty to pay use taxes to Colorado. 133 The law also requires
retailers to release the names and addresses of Colorado buyers. 134 The
Colorado legislature hopes that sellers prefer to charge the tax and remit the
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
See generally Performance Mktg. Ass’n v. Hamer, 998 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. 2013).
See Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y.

2013).
128. See Yang & Aquilino, supra note 2, at 6.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 6–7.
131. See Jennifer Dunn, What Creates Sales Tax Nexus in Every State, TAXJAR (May 22, 2017),
https://blog.taxjar.com/sales-tax-nexus-every-state/.
132. See generally Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016).
133. See generally id.
134. Id. at 1133.
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proceeds to Colorado rather than informing buyers of their duties to remit
sales taxes on their own. In August of 2016, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the
Colorado Increased Notification law is not unduly burdensome on Congress’
commerce power and it was not discriminatory; thus, the law is
constitutional. 135 In other states, similar laws were stuck down by state courts
holding that such laws discriminate against out-of-state sellers and that they
are an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause. 136 Most recently,
the South Dakota courts, citing Quill, stuck down a Nexus law requiring
sellers with over $100 of sales within South Dakota to remit sales taxes. 137
Both the Nexus laws and the Increased Notification laws have created a
stir in the federal and state court systems. 138 The circuit splits are in desperate
need of a resolution from the highest authority, the Supreme Court. Yet, both
the Supreme Court and Congress continue to let this long-standing national
issue go unresolved. 139 The Supreme Court’s avoidance of the e-commerce
sales tax issue resonates with many state governments, small businesses, and
state citizens who have urged the federal government to act. 140
V. “SOMETHING’S GOTTA GIVE”
A. ADVANTAGE OF DODGING SALES TAXES
Sales taxes may seem like a trivial or negligible competitive edge for
online businesses who are not required to charge it, and many question
whether it is truly an advantage for online retailers. 141 However, a deeper
look shows that small brick and mortar shops, and big-box retailers such as
Target, Walgreens, and BestBuy are required to charge sales taxes. 142 These
retailers and small shops are caught in a losing battle with online retailers
such as Amazon, Overstock, and Wayfair, which are generally able to avoid
the sales taxes. 143 Research conducted at Ohio State University revealed that
shoppers in jurisdictions that impose an “Amazon Tax” spend 9.5% less on
Amazon products. 144 This dip in Amazon sales was especially prominent for
big ticket items costing over $300, which generally incur higher sales

135. Id. at 1147–51.
136. See Yang & Aquilino, supra note 2.
137. See Why You Should Care About South Dakota’s Controversial Online Sales Tax Law,

supra note 10.
138. See id.
139. See generally supra Part III.
140. See generally David Pope & Laura Grace Mezher, Is the Kill-Quill Movement Gaining
Momentum? BAKER MCKENZIE: SALT SAVVY (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.saltsavvy.com/2017/04
/04/is-the-kill-quill-movement-gaining-momentum/.
141. See Online Retailers Have Clear Advantage by Not Collecting Sales Tax, OHIO ST. U.
FISHER C. OF BUS. (Apr. 23, 2014), https://fisher.osu.edu/article_archive/3897.
142. See generally Ashabi, supra note 6.
143. See id.
144. See Online Retailers Have Clear Advantage by Not Collecting Sales Tax, supra note 141.
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taxes. 145 The study further observed that the dip in consumption of Amazon
products created a bump in sales for online-only retailers not subject to the
tax, and to brick and mortar retailers like BestBuy, where buyers can see the
product before purchasing it and return unwanted purchases with greater
ease. 146 In other words, after the tax imposition, consumers redirected
purchases to local stores, resulting in a 7.1% increase in sales of traditional
retailers. 147 This study confirms the suspicion that online retailers enjoy a
windfall as long as they are not subject to sales taxes.
B. EBAY’S OPPOSITION TO THE TAX
Online retailers, eBay and PayPal, strongly oppose online sales taxes—
claiming that although imposition of sales tax requirements on online retails
aims to even the playing field between online companies and brick and
mortar stores, it creates a disadvantage to smaller online retailers and
vendors. 148 Tod Cohen, eBay’s Vice President for Government Relations and
Deputy General Counsel, spoke out against the Marketplace Fairness Act
stating “[t]his is another Internet sales tax bill that fails to protect small
business retailers using the Internet and will unbalance the playing field
between giant retailers and small business competitors” . . . such a tax
“burdens on small businesses at a time when we want entrepreneurs to create
jobs and economic activity.” 149 eBay opposes the tax because it will create a
tax disparity between smaller online vendors whose revenues are much lower
than large online retailers. 150
Large vendors can easily afford expensive computerized tax programs or
accountants to ensure that their sales taxes are properly paid. Conversely,
smaller online vendors who do not make nearly as much profit as large
companies, like Amazon, do not have the resources to pour into accounting
and taxing. Patrick Byrne, CEO of Overstock.com, explained that there are
over 9,000 taxing jurisdictions, each taxing different products at different
rates: “[i]n one jurisdiction, cotton candy is food; in another it’s

145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Sarah Halzack, The True Cost to Amazon of the ‘Amazon Tax’, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2016),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/01/13/the-true-cost-to-amazon-of-theamazon-tax/?utm_term=.7e44cc36fc4e.
148. See Robert W. Wood, Marketplace Fairness Tax Pits Amazon v. eBay, FORBES (Nov. 14,
2011, 6:14 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2011/11/14/marketplace-fairness-taxpits-amazon-v-ebay/print/.
149. Id.; see generally Tod Cohen, Sellers: If You Oppose Internet Sales Tax Bill, Make Your
Voice Heard, EBAY COMMUNITY: ANNOUNCEMENTS (Nov. 12, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://commun
ity.ebay.com/t5/Announcements/Sellers-If-you-oppose-the-Internet-Sales-Tax-Bill-make-your/bap/26163348.
150. See Wood, supra note 148; see also Cohen, supra note 149.
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entertainment or candy.” 151 This is yet another reason why smaller online
companies and vendors are at a disadvantage compared to large online
retailers.
C. AMAZON’S SWAP
Historically, Amazon has been unwaveringly against any imposition of
e-commerce sales taxes. 152 However, “in a hilariously brazen display of
crony capitalism, Amazon itself switched sides a few years ago.”153
Amazon’s board and executives claim that its change of heart is altruistic and
that it is about time to level the playing field for all businesses alike. 154 In
fact, Amazon’s Vice President for Global Public Policy, Paul Misener, wrote
a letter to the Senate on Valentine’s Day of 2013 thanking them for favoring
the Marketplace Fairness Act. 155 Despite Amazon’s stated reasons for
supporting such tax proposals, a more likely reason for Amazon’s swap is
that the tax is burdensome and prohibitive for smaller online retailers. 156
Perhaps Amazon is anticipating that e-commerce sales taxation will
discourage and potentially crush existing competition from smaller
alternative online retails.
Amazon’s altruistic reasoning also seems unlikely in light of Amazon’s
relatively recent sensation, “Amazon Prime,” providing free and fast
shipping. In order to achieve free and fast shipping, Amazon has situated
large warehouses in strategic places, like larger cities, around the country. 157
These warehouses give Amazon a “physical presence” in states where they
are located, forcing Amazon to charge sales taxes in those states. 158 This is
precisely why Amazon traditionally avoided placing warehouses in large
states. 159 However, Amazon’s board and executives have realized that its taxfree reign is coming to an end, and while Amazon has agreed to pay more
sales taxes, it has also expanded warehouse construction in states it avoided
in the past. 160 With warehouses in even more locations, Amazon’s hope is
151. Farhad Manjoo, Why I Love the National Internet Sales Tax Plan, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2013,
6:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/04/national_internet_sales_t
ax_why_i_love_the_marketplace_fairness_act_and.html.
152. See Robert Verbruggen, Our Online Sales-Tax Loophole: A New Proposal to Close it is
Promising, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.theamericanconservative.
com/artiles/our-online-sales-tax-loophole/.
153. Id.
154. See Tricia Duryee, Amazon’s Love Note to Senate Backs Sales-Tax Proposal, ALL THINGS
D (Feb. 14, 2013, 12:12 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20130214/amazons-love-note-to-senate-backssales-tax-proposal/.
155. Id.
156. See Jacob Goldstein, Why Amazon Supports an Online Sales-Tax Bill, NPR (Apr. 22, 2013,
12:57 PM), http://www.npr.com/sections/money/2013/04/22/178407898/why-amazon-supports-an
-online-sale-tax-bill.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
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that it will be able to expedite shipping to free same-day shipping, providing
consumers swift gratification at the click of a button. 161 Thus, despite sales
tax fees, Amazon will be able to maintain a competitive edge over brick and
mortar retailers, and over smaller online retailers who either charge for
shipping or require more time to ship products to consumers. 162 This is how
large retailers such as Amazon, Alibaba, and Overstock, with copious
resources designated for research and development, will be able to maintain
their competitive edge over smaller businesses and brick and mortar retailers,
despite the imposition of sales taxes.
In March of 2017, Amazon publicly announced its decision to collect
sales taxes in every state, except the NOMAD states, and they began doing
so the following April. 163 However, it is important to understand that this tax
does not apply to Amazon’s third-party vendors, which account for about half
of Amazon’s sales. 164 Further, just one month later, Jeff Bezos, the founder
and CEO of Amazon, announced Amazon’s bold decision to purchase the
brick and mortar giant, Whole Foods. 165 The timing of Amazon’s sales tax
policy and its subsequent $13.7 billion decision to establish itself as a brick
and mortar business is not a coincidence.
The advent of Amazon Prime was just the beginning of Amazon’s quest
to revolutionize retail shopping. 166 Amazon also seeks to alter the way in
which consumers shop at brick and mortar stores, but the only way to do so
successfully was to become a brick and mortar itself. 167 Whole Foods
physically resides in over forty states, 168 giving Amazon the physical
presence it needs to require payment of sales taxes. 169 Amazon’s decision to
become a brick and mortar has been a part of Amazon’s development plan
for several years. 170 It began with physical book stores and moved to grocery
shops through another Amazon offshoot, “Amazon Go.” 171 Amazon Go
eliminates cash registers and the need to wait on lines through the use of

161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See David Z. Morris, Amazon to Collect Sales Tax in Most States Starting April 1st,
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es/list/state (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
169. See Aziza, supra note 165.
170. See Impact of Amazon Buying Whole Foods, supra note 166.
171. See id.
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sensor technology and cell phone applications. 172 Amazon will likely
implement this complex technology system into all of its brick and mortar
stores, including Whole Foods. 173 This may explain Amazon’s brilliant
public relations decision to make the seemingly generous choice to collect
sales tax just prior to establishing itself as a brick and mortar.
Amazon’s sales tax decision may also be a way for it to mend its sullied
history with a number of states. Some states did not wait for Congress to
resolve the sales tax issue and resorted to cutting deals with Amazon in order
to raise tax revenue. 174 Other states have refused to cut deals with Amazon
and, to Amazon’s dismay, have passed sales tax litigation hitting Amazon
with multi-million-dollar tax bills; such states were met with retaliation. 175
For example, when New York passed the “Amazon Tax” laws it was met
with a costly and onerous lawsuit. 176 Similarly, after Texas presented
Amazon with a $261 million tax bill, Amazon stated that the “unfavorable
regulatory environment” forced Amazon to close its Texan warehouse,
leaving the warehouse employees out of work. 177
This history of vengeance against state tax legislation prompted many
states to cut mutually beneficial tax deals with Amazon. 178 For instance, after
California’s tax bill was met with aggression, California agreed to postpone
the tax for one year. 179 Amazon agreed that if after one year Congress does
not pass federal legislation, which it did not, Amazon would comply with the
California tax. 180 Alabama agreed to lock the sales tax rate at 8% in exchange
for Amazon’s compliance with its tax legislation. 181 Similarly, when South
Carolina proposed a sales tax on Amazon, Amazon threatened to stop
construction on a warehouse it was building there. 182 After much back-andforth, South Carolina agreed to exempt Amazon from sales taxes for five
years, which would expire early only if Congress passes conflicting
legislation, and Amazon agreed that its warehouse would create 2,000
jobs. 183
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While the states and Amazon are happy with such negotiations, brick and
mortar retailers and smaller online vendors with far less bargaining power
than Amazon are still left at a disadvantage. Tax deals and loopholes allow
large companies like Amazon, Alibaba, Wayfair, and Overstock, to maintain
their current taxing advantage by casting the needs of small online retailers
and local businesses to the side. 184 Tax deals ignore the larger goal of making
sales tax the same for all businesses; thus, in the long term, tax deals will
damage local economies and discourage small businesses. 185
While Amazon is currently collecting sales taxes, it continues to advocate
for nation-wide congressional action to resolve the inconsistencies involved
with e-commerce taxation. 186 Perhaps Amazon believes federal legislation is
a lesser evil compared to state tax legislation, because Amazon will likely
have a seat at the negotiation table to ensure that congressional action allows
it to maintain its competitive edge. Now that Amazon has begun its foray into
the brick and mortar world, its dreams of federal sales tax legislation may
soon become reality, but only time will tell whether Congress will indeed
take the plunge.
VI. A NEW SOLUTION TO THE E-COMMERCE SALE TAXATION
PROBLEM: MODERNIZED ORIGIN-BASED PROPOSAL
A sensible sales tax solution will only result from a collaborative effort
at both the federal and state levels. It is possible to create a balanced federal
act that does not violate any constitutional tenants and does not trample on
states’ rights to set their own sales tax rates and regulate their own sales tax
systems. The Modernized Origin-Based System Proposed in this Note offers
a possible solution to the e-commerce tax problem.
A. ADOPTING THE ORIGIN-BASED MODEL
Quill is outdated and in great need of Congressional action to change the
status quo by passing legislation that codifies the Nexus test created by many
states. Many bills have been proposed, but a middle ground that balances
different components of these bills is a more agreeable solution. A successful
e-commerce bill must incorporate an Origin-Based sales tax system. Unlike
the No Regulation Without Representation Act, which ignores the inequities
of the status quo, an Origin-Based Sales Tax Model is uncomplicated,
efficient, and will engender healthy competition. 187
Congress must step in to codify a law based on either an Origin-Based or
Destination-Based Sales Tax because granting the states the power to impose
184. See id.
185. See John Arensmeyer, Small Businesses Like Corporate Tax Cut Only if Loopholes Closed,
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186. See Brunner, supra note 10.
187. See Kranz et al., supra note 112.
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either one could lead to a double taxation. Imagine a buyer lives in a state
that imposes a Destination-Based tax but purchases an item from a state that
imposes an Origin-Based tax. That buyer will be responsible for a sales tax
in both states. Such a system punishes the buyer and cannot be maintained.
Congress must make a choice between an Origin-Based Sales Tax Model or
a Destination-Based Sales Tax Model, but because an Origin-Based Model
is more efficient and easier to implement, it should be adopted. Unlike
Representative Goodlatte’s 2015 Proposal, which required a federal
clearinghouse to administer tax revenues, 188 an added expense that will likely
come out of the taxpayer’s pockets, the Modernized Origin-Based system
would not require any federal administration. Rather, the current system can
remain in place, whereby sellers charge local rates and remit the sales tax to
the seller’s taxing agency.
B. CAVEAT EMPTOR
If a buyer travels to a foreign state, makes several purchases, and
consumes or uses the purchases there, that buyer must pay the foreign sales
tax rates. Similarly, when a buyer enters a website and makes purchases in
another state, that buyer is virtually traveling to another location. The two are
alike and should be treated alike, thus e-commerce sales taxes should be
Origin-Based.
Many are opposed to the idea that under an Origin-Based sales ax buyers
may be subject to taxing rates outside of their own jurisdictions. In fact, this
is the main criticism of Goodlatte’s 2015 Proposal. 189 However, with a
Destination-Based tax, the same issue occurs in the converse, because sellers
are subject to charging sales taxes outside of their own jurisdictions. 190 With
the Origin-Based tax, buyers who are opposed to paying foreign rates can
also go out and support their local shops, while sellers cannot discriminate
against out-of-state buyers. Buyers always have the option to pick and choose
sellers with more agreeable rates. This system facilitates the growth of local
brick and mortar retailers, as adamant buyers preferring their local tax rates
will purchase products from resident shops.
For this system to be truly fair, buyers must be aware of the jurisdiction
that online sellers are subject to before making purchases. Thus, the
Modernized Origin-Based Proposal would require vendors to list all the
jurisdictions in which they have actual Physical Presence or Nexus in their
shopping cart tabs. These Nexus notifications are similar to the Increased
Notification laws imposed by the Colorado legislature. 191 However, rather
than notifying buyers of their duty to remit a use tax, it informs buyers which
188.
189.
190.
191.

See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 101.
See id.
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 324 (1992).
See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
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taxing jurisdiction governs the given transaction. 192 The jurisdiction lists
must be placed at the top of the shopping cart list before the buyers can
choose to enter payment information and finalize purchases. Lists must also
be in a font, size, and color that stands out and catches the buyer’s eye.
Further, vendors should provide links, directly under the lists, to additional
information about e-commerce sales taxation. This will allow buyers to probe
the issue further before making purchases, so buyers can better understand
what the sales taxing jurisdiction list represents and understand that
completing the purchase may require subjecting themselves to foreign tax
rates. Thus, buyers can either knowingly choose to subject themselves to
foreign rates, or they can choose to avoid the online purchase and buy a
comparable item from a local business.
C. STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Although the Origin-Based Model would be implemented via
Congressional Act, it also sets up a national guideline for the states to follow.
Sovereignty will be preserved because the states will still be able to pass their
own laws, and set their own rates, so long as the laws are within the confines
of the bill. This Modernized Proposal will utilize a clause similar to one found
in section six of the Marketplace Fairness Act which provides that “this Act
shall not be construed to preempt or limit any power exercised or to be
exercised by a State or local jurisdiction under the law of such State or local
jurisdiction under any other Federal law.” 193
The proposal suggests that Nexus laws like the “Amazon Tax” be set at
higher rates so that small online businesses, with less resources and revenues,
are able to easily calculate sales tax rates and are able to reduce the cost of
determining in which states they have a Nexus. Currently, most states have
rates set at $10,000—meaning that if a company sells over $10,000 worth of
goods in a given state, then it has established Nexus and can be subject to
sales taxes in that state. 194 PayPal and eBay have stated that a rate of $5
million better supports small businesses, especially those that have located
their businesses in certain states precisely for tax purposes. 195
What threshold to set is a complicated question and requires
consideration of numerous factors. For instance, a vendor that only services
two or three states total and sells $10,000 of revenues in each of those three
states, the vendor’s total revenue is only $30,000. Conversely, if a vendor
sells $10,000 of revenue in forty states, that vendor is selling at least
$400,000 of revenue. The contrast between these two vendors is drastic.
However, the object is to make taxation simpler, thus setting different
192.
193.
194.
195.

See id.
Marketplace Fairness Act of 2017, S. 976, 115th Cong. (2017).
See Yang & Aquilino, supra note 2, at 6.
See Wood, supra note 148.
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minimum thresholds for varying companies is not a viable solution. eBay’s
$5 million proposal is too high because it will still allow large companies that
service several states to dodge sales taxes. 196 However, the current $10,000
threshold that many states use is too low, because it can really hurt small
business that do not cater to many states. 197 There must be a reasonable and
impartial threshold set that will be fair to most businesses across the board.
D. DEDUCTION AND TAX BREAK FREE
Offering sales tax breaks to large online companies, like Amazon,
Wayfair, and Newegg, 198 will not help level the playing field and will defeat
the purpose underlying e-commerce sales taxation laws and proposals. States
can set their own sales tax rates, but for this to fix the e-commerce tax
problem, sales taxes must be applied equally to businesses of all shapes and
sizes. There have been tax deals already in place that effectively force such
deals to expire should Congress pass e-commerce sales tax legislation.199
Thus, the most effective way to make things more balanced amongst
businesses is to eradicate any existing sales tax breaks and prevent new ones
from being formed through Congressional legislation.
E. NO FORUM SHOPPING
Sellers with multiple locations will be prohibited from forum shopping
and choosing the most convenient sales tax rate. If the seller has Physical
Presence or Nexus in the same state that the buyer is located, the seller must
charge their common state rate. However, under the Modern Origin-Based
proposal, when the seller does not have Physical Presences or Nexus where
the buyer is located, it charges a sales tax at the jurisdictional “nerve center”
or principle place of businesses. 200 The principal place of business is usually
where the company is incorporated. 201 Companies that exist solely online—
and do not have physical presence anywhere—are still required to
incorporate, or maintain a permit or license to conduct business. 202 Wherever
such virtual companies are authorized to conduct business should be
considered its principal place of business, and it should charge sales taxes at
that state’s rates.

196. See id.
197. See id.
198. “Newegg Inc. is a leading online retailer committed to becoming the most loved and trusted

marketplace on the web.” Corporate Summary, NEWEGG, https://www.newegg.com/Info/AboutUs
.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
199. See Brunner, supra note 10 (South Carolina agreed to give Amazon five years of tax amnesty
which would disappear if Congress passed federal tax legislation during that five-year period).
200. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 1186 (2010).
201. See id. at 1183.
202. See id.
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The “sales sourcing rules” associated with the Destination-Based
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act are complicated and force sellers to spend
needless time and energy to determine where exactly the buyer is located.203
The result of such a complicated and lengthy rule is that often it is too difficult
to pinpoint the exact location of the buyer, thus the seller must change to an
Origin-Based tax regardless. 204 Under the Modernized Origin-Based
Proposal, the buyer’s location is only relevant when the seller must determine
whether it shares a common location with the buyer. If it does, it must charge
that shared state’s sales tax rate, even if it is not the seller’s principal place
of business. Under this Modernized Proposal, wherever the item is being
shipped is assumed to be the buyer’s location. However, if the purchase is a
virtual item, the buyer’s location would be determined by the billing address.
Because this new proposal eliminates the SSUTA’s “sales sourcing
rules” and has a short list of basic rules that help sellers determine the proper
sales tax rate, sellers can save time and money that otherwise would have
been spent on accounting and costly tax programs. Instead, this money and
time can be invested back into businesses to help them grow, innovate, and
flourish. Simpler tax systems, like an Origin-Based tax, facilitate growth of
businesses and allow them to put their money to better use.
F. NO USE TAX FOR E-COMMERCE
Lastly, the Modernized Origin-Based Proposal eradicates use taxes for ecommerce sales. Use taxes are only utilized by 1.6% of Americans. 205 This
low participation rate exists because most people do not even know what a
use tax is, how it works, or that they are required to pay a use tax for online
purchases. 206 Thus, states lose billions of dollars each year in use tax
revenues. 207 Such a system encourages tax evasion. Like Representative
Goodlatte’s proposals, 208 under the Modernized Origin-Based Proposal,
buyers will not receive a tax credit from the origin state and they are not
required to remit that tax credit to the destination state as a use tax. Instead,
the Origin-Based tax, at the point of sale, is the end of the line for e-commerce
sales taxation. This system makes sense, as sellers are in a better position to
charge sales taxes since they are generally more aware of how sales taxes
apply to transactions.

203. See Yang & Aquilino, supra note 2, at 9.
204. See id.
205. Chana Joffe-Walt, Most People are Supposed to Pay this Tax: Almost Nobody Actually Pays

it, NPR (Apr. 16, 2013, 3:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2013/04/16/177384487/m
ost-people-are-supposed-to-pay-this-tax.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 101.
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VII. MODERNIZED ORIGIN-BASED PROPOSAL: A GIVE AND
TAKE SOLUTION
One criticism of the Origin-Based sales taxation is that it will engender
too much sales tax competition among the states by causing a race to the
bottom. 209 While some believe that this sort of competition plagues the
Origin-Based tax, others see it as an asset. 210 However, since lowering sales
tax rates benefits buyers, sellers, and the economy overall, it is a strength of
an Origin-Based system. Further, taxing according to the purchaser’s location
is unreasonable; buyers do not choose where to maintain a home or job
because of the local sales tax rates, but sellers often choose where to locate
their businesses using sales tax as a determining factor. 211 Thus, the state
where the seller is located should be the state that chooses the sales tax rates,
which sellers will ultimately tack onto final sales prices. This system
encourages states to lower sales tax rates in attempt to entice companies to
not only move there, but develop and grow their businesses in the state.
At first blush, some states may be unhappy with the idea of lowering tax
rates. However, in the long run, losses incurred from lower sales tax rates
will be offset because when companies move to a state, they assist in feeding
the local economy by increasing spending and bringing jobs, and through
other forms of tax revenues, such as income taxes and corporate taxes. 212
Further, when more sellers are located in a given state due to favorable tax
rates, either physically or by way of Nexus, that state will likely collect sales
taxes for a larger number of transactions overall.
Once Nexus laws, like the “Amazon tax,” are regulated and incorporated
into a Congressional Act that sets proper threshold requirements, many states
would adopt Nexus laws with far less fear of costly judicial challenges. Thus,
states like New York, that do not wish to compete by lowering tax rates, will
pass laws like the “Amazon Tax” without fear of judicial backlash. Such a
law will require businesses that reach the threshold to register as local
vendors and subject them to local tax rates via Nexus. 213 The only piece of
the “Amazon Tax” that the Modernized Origin-Based proposal will regulate
is the minimum threshold for establishing an Economic Nexus.
Although this requires the parties involved to compromise, each party
will benefit from this long-term solution to the e-commerce taxation problem.
States will only gain tax revenue when local sellers or sellers with Nexus
209. See Ryan Riebe, The Unfair Effects of the Marketplace Fairness Act, FREEDOMWORKS
(Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.freedomworks.org/content/unfair-effects-marketplace-fairness-act.
210. See id.
211. See generally The Best (and Worst) States to Incorporate In, MAXFILINGS, https://www.
maxfilings.com/incorporation-knowledge-center/which-states-have-the-best-business-taxclimate.php (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
212. See Daniel Mitchell, The Historical Lessons of Lower Tax Rates, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION (Aug. 13, 2003), http://www.heritage.org/node/18247/print-display.
213. See Yang & Aquilino, supra note 2, at 4–5.
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transact business, but not from transactions between in-state buyers and outof-state sellers. Brick and mortar retailers will gain business from local
buyers who prefer in-state rates to foreign rates. Since the Modernized
Origin-Based Proposal will lower sales tax rates overall, sellers will not have
to charge high tax rates and buyers will not have to pay high rates. Although
lower tax rates will cause states to lose sales tax revenues, the losses will be
recaptured through increased consumption, job creation, income taxes,
corporate taxes, and other such tax revenues that businesses generate.
Further, NOMAD states with no sales taxes will enjoy state sovereignty and
will not be required to charge any sales tax. Lastly, lower tax rates will
encourage companies to stay in the United State instead of offshoring,
thereby strengthening the economy overall.
With the advent of the Internet and e-commerce, retail has truly become
a global market. To compete in a modern world, many retailers have become
accessible online. Thus, e-commerce sales taxes represent an enormous
portion of tax revenues. The United States must resolve this issue at the
federal level in a way that allows it to remain competitive in the global
market. The Modernized Origin-Based Proposal would accomplish this by
lowering sales tax rates and simplifying the sales tax system—making the
United States a welcoming environment for corporations.
CONCLUSION
Since the explosion of e-commerce, the Quill decision has become
incredibly outdated. Severe issues arise for sales tax purposes when buyers
and sellers do not have a physical presence in the same state, as the Quill
precedent requires. This decision has created great conflict within the judicial
system, economic disparity between online retailers and brick and mortar
retailers, and state tax deficits. Congress must implement and codify
guidelines for the states to follow when imposing sales taxes.
In contrast to the numerous Designation-Based Proposals that have been
pending in Congress, the Modernized Origin-Based sales tax proposed in this
Note will reduce e-commerce sales tax complexities, eliminate use tax
complications, stimulate equal competition for all business models, preserve
state sovereignty, and naturally lower sales tax rates overall. Although all
parties will have to compromise, an Origin-Based sales tax for online retailers
is the surest way to please the largest number of parties involved. Lastly, the
Modernized Origin-Based Proposal will ensure that the states receive the
much needed sales tax revenue of which they have been deprived for far too
long.
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EPILOGUE
On January 12, 2018, just prior to publication of this Note, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari of South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 214 stating that it will
consider the physical presence test generally. 215 It will likely overturn the
physical presence test and sufficient minimum contacts tests germinated by
National Bellas Hess, decided in 1967, and Quill, decided in 1992. 216 These
decisions do not allow a state to tax a business unless that business is
physically located or conducts a sufficient amount of business within that
given state, as allowing such taxation would interfere with Congress’ power
to regulate interstate commerce. 217 Countless brick and mortar businesses and
state governments have argued that the physical presence test affords online
retailers an unfair advantage by allowing them to evade taxes. 218 The large
online retailer defendants of South Dakota v. Wayfair argue that Congress is
in a better position to address this issue than the Supreme Court, hoping to
avoid payment of sales taxes for as long as possible. 219 Wayfair and its codefendants may see Congressional action before the Supreme Court issues an
opinion on their case, but the long history of discord regarding e-commerce
sales taxation makes such a scenario improbable. 220 Congress is more likely
to will wait until the Supreme Court overturns the physical presence test
before enacting federal legislation in an effort to harmonize inconsistent state
laws. 221 Although the landscape of federal action is still unclear, after nearly
thirty years, the Supreme Court has certainly broken its silence. 222
Juliana Frenkel *
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